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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
WERNER KIEPE, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
and Cross Respondent, 
vs. 
ELT D. LeCHEMINANT, 
Defendant-Respondent 
and Cross Appellant. 
Case No. 10310 
• 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the judgment of the Third District Court 
For Salt Lake County 
Hon. Marcellus K. Snow, Judge 
Defendant's Brief contains several statements which 
are not only not supported by the record but are untrue, 
and if not denied may be confusing to the Court in con-
sidering the matters at issue in this appeal. 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT PARTICIPATED IN APPELLANT'S IN-
COME FROM APPRAISAL BUSINESS. 
At Page 8 of his brief, Respondent states: 
"The fact, as shown by the record, is that 
while the partners continued on in the same office, 
Appellant took into his possession and under his 
eontrol the appraisal business and records, claim-
ing those assets as his own and not partnership 
assets, and Appellant conducted his own inde-
pendent appraisal business. H<· did not ·1•11 , R . . . . l f·rn1 
that PS~~ondrnt part1c1pate _rn tlit- mc·o111(' tlt(·Ii· 
from wl111e Respondent ear"·wd on tli(' rno1·tn·i 
loan and immrance bm;irn•ss of ilie 1nntl'('J'.~'i 1~!· f . . , , IJI rom \dnch Appellant <'XlH'cted to and did at alt 
ti~es partici~ate in_ the income• .inst as ]11 • rlirl 
prior to the d1ssolut10n of the partner:shij1.'' 
Respondent does not cite any page of the re~ord tri 
support this statement. 
There is nothing in the record to show that "Ap]iel 
lant took into his possession and under his control the 
appraisal business and records, claiming thosf• a:::1;et8 a~ 
his own." 
The fact is that Respondent participated in the in-
come from the appraisals made hy Appellant just the 
same as he had done at all times prior to January 1, 1963 
(R. 63, first four lines of Paragraph 9 of the Judgment). 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT RETAIN JURISDICTION OF 
THE CASE AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL TO SETTLE 
THE MATTER OF DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND EX-
PENSES DURING THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 1, 1963 TO 
FEBRUARY 1, 1964. 
At the last two lines of Page 2 and at Page 3 of hi' 
brief, Respondent states: 
"The only question before the Court is what 
is an equitable basis upon which the parties opPr-
ated for the period of thirteen months from tl1•1: 
date of dissolution until the final breaking off 
date. rrhe attention of the Court is din·ctt>d to 
the fact that this phast> of the cm;e was not J1_1arl:· 
an issue by the pleadings. rrhe trial court retauJPd 
•_) 
u 
juri8dirtion after having entered its judgment on 
the case, at the request of counsel, to settle the 
controversy which had arisen between the parties 
as to this thirteen-month period of time when the 
parties could not resolve their differences. The 
order from which the appeal is taken was initiated 
not by any pleadings, but upon application of 
Respondent for an order to show cause why Ap-
rwllant should not be found in contempt of court 
for having failed to comply with the judgment 
of the Court which was made and entered on 
March 12, 1964. At this hearing on Respondent's 
application both parties initiated the matter of 
accountings for the thirteen-month period subse-
quent to the date of dissolution." 
Respondent cites no page or pages of the record to 
support any of the misstatements above made. 
~1he question of the "equitable basis under which 
the parties operated for the period of thirteen months 
from the date of dissolution to the final breaking off 
date" was tried by the Court and was decided on Febru-
ary 13, 1964 (R. 153 to R. 245). Judgment was entered 
March 12, 1964, (R. 60-64). The judgment became final 
thirty days thereafter. 
The statement that "the trial court retained juris-
diction after having entered its judgment on the case 
at the request of counsel to settle the controversy which 
!tad arisen between the parties as to the thirteen-month 
)!~rio<l of time when the parties could not resolve their 
difft·rencP8" i8 wholly false, and no page of the record 
i.' ,·ilt>d in 8Upport thereof. Counsel did not request the 
Court to retain jurisdiction "to settle the controversy 
4 
which had arjsen between the parties as to the tltirtel:n. 
month period." As above stated, the judgment of March 
12, 1964 (R. 60-64) decided all questions ronePmi'l"· · 
'h 111 
come and disbursements during the thirteen-month peri 
od. (R. 245 and R. 60-64). Nearly 100 pages of record 
were made in presenting this matter. (R. 153-:2-1:5). 
The statement that at the hearing of Jmw 13, 1%1 
and June 24, 1964, which were held upon orcfors to ~lH,\\ 
cause directed to both Appellant and Respondent, that 
"both parties initiated the matter of accounting for thP 
thirteen-month period subsequent to the date of dis-
solution" is not true, nor is any page of the record citPd 
in support thereof. It is true that at said hearing Re-
spondent questioned some items contained in settlemr11t 
statements furnished by Appellant, and in rebuttal Ap-
pellant adduced some evidence relative to services per-
formed by Ruth Barlow and Richard Christensen and 
some evidence on bonuses, but both parties did not initi-
ate the matter of accountings. The only ruling that the 
Court made upon said hearings which was ilifferent frorn 
the judgment of March 12, 1964, was that "Def enda11t 
LeCheminant will receive the sum of $2,500.00 for hi~ 
efforts and services during the last thirteen months in 
preserving the mortgage loan asset of the partnPrship. ,. 
Not a word of pleading was filed in this matter, nor waE 
it at issue, nor was it mentioned, nor was a word of 
evidence adduced thereon at said hearings. (R. 246-308). 
rrhe Court did not consider that matter. 
Respondent in his memorandum for the Court after 
5 
'"1id Jwa rings and before the Court entered its Order for 
Judgment, started out his memorandum as follows: 
'"rhe Court having designated four points to 
he covered by this memorandum, Defendant will 
treat these points in the following order: (1) 
Compensation paid to Ruth Barlow; (2) Com-
pensation paid to R. L. Christensen; (3) Per-
centage of commission to be paid producer; ( 4) 
Contempt. (R. 84)" 
As stated in Appellant's brief at Pages 19 to 22, 
this issue of whether Respondent was entitled to any 
compensation for "preserving the mortgage loan asset" 
was decided by the judgment of March 12, 1964, and 
was res adjudicata before the hearings of June 13 and 
24 were held. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT GAINS NO BENEFIT FROM THE FACT 
THAT THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS TO SUP-
PORT THE JUDGMENT ON THE MATTER OF SALARIES 
AWARDED TO RUTH BARLOW AND R. L. CHRISTENSEN. 
At Pages 3 and 4 of Respondent's brief, he states: 
"As is heretofore stated, not only are there 
no pleadings or findings to support this award 
under the order appealed from as contended by 
Appellant, but there are no pleadings, findings 
and conclusions to support that part of the order 
which Appellant is willing to have stand and to 
have enforced against Respondent, which bene-
fits Appellant, fromwhich Respondent takes his 
cross appeal, that part of the judgment pertain-
ing to salaries awarded Ruth Barlow and R. L. 
Christensen and charged against partnership op-
erations." 
6 
Appellant cannot understand ho\\· Respon(bt j, 
helped because he filed no pleadings and tlH· C:nnl i'i 
tered no findings or conclusions to support the CourL 
judgment pertaining to salaries awarded to Ruth Barlmr 
and R. L. Christensen and charged against the part11 (,J'-
ship operations. It was Respondent who asked that said 
salaries not be charged against partnership operations 
but failed to make any pleadings, findings or conclusions. 
The Appellant promptly moved for a new trial and 
for amendments of the "Judgment Designated Order'' 
of November 9, 1964, not only on the ground that the 
Court failed to make and enter findings and eonclnsion.' 
in support of the judgment, but that the evidPncP wa~ in-
sufficient to support the part of the judgment for Re-
spondent on the matter of awarding him compensation 
for "preserving the mortgage loan asset of the partner-
ship," and the issue had before been decided against 
Respondent by a judgment that became final and was 
res adjudicata. Respondent has never made a motion 
for a new trial or to amend judgment because the judg-
ment was entered against Respondent on the matter of 
salaries awarded to Ruth Barlow and R L. Christen~~n. 
POINT IV 
THE PARTIES DID NOT WAIVE FINDINGS AND CON-
CLUSIONS IN THE CASE PROPER. 
At Page 4 of his brief, Respondent states: 
"It is to be noted that the parties waived find-
ings and conclusions in the case proper." 
d · ·t d · oi·t of tlii~ No page of the recor is c1 e m supp · 
7 
0tatenwnt, and it is untrue. The Judgment Designated 
i)rder was signed November 9, 1964 (R. 110). Appellant 
on the same day, November 9, 1964, served motion for 
new trial on the grounds of failure to file findings and 
conclusions (R. 112). 
POINT V 
THE PARTIES DID NOT AGREE TO SUBMIT THE MAT-
TER OF "COMPENSATION TO THE RESPONDENT FOR 
HIS HAVING PRESERVED THE MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET 
OF THE PARTNERSHIP" AND TO ABIDE ITS DECISION 
AFTER THE JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 1964 WAS EN-
TERED THEREON. 
At Pages 4 and 5 of his brief, Respondent stated: 
"'l1he action is an equitable action and con-
trary to the arguments of Appellant that the 
Court heard no evidence to support its order, the 
Court did hear evidence and had theretofore indi-
cated to counsel that it intended to award some 
compensation to Respondent for his having pre-
served the mortgage loan asset of the partnership 
and having retained jurisdiction of the case at the 
request of both counsel, the case having been tried 
piece-meal, exercised its equitable powers in en-
tering its order allowing compensation to Re-
spondent for his services rendered. The parties 
agreed to submit this phase of the case to the 
Court and abide its decision. Therefore, an appeal 
from the ruling is not in order nor is the order 
appealed from an appealable order." 
No page of the record is cited in support of any of 
th~se statements. 
The statement that " ( 1) the Court did hear evi-
dence and (2) had theretofore indicated to counsel that 
it intt·nded to award some compensation to Respondent 
8 
for his having preserved the mortgage loan asstit of the 
partnership, and ( 3) having retained jurisdiction of the 
cas~ at the request of both counsel * * * exercising it, 
eqmtable powers entered its order allowing comriensa-
tion for his services rendered, and ( 4) the parties agreed 
to submit this phase of the case to the Court and to 
abide its decision" is in each of the four snbclivisio
11
, 
false. 
After the judgment of March 12, 1964, (R. 6U-G1) 
in which the Court adjudged that "the judgment herein 
entered constitutes an accord and satisfaction of all 
claims each of the parties has against the other,'' not onl' 
word of evidence was introduced nor one word of argu-
ment made on the matter of allowing Respondent any 
compensations for "preserving the mortgage loan asset 
of the business." (R. 245-R. 308). 
The Court's equitable powers are to enter judgment 
upon proper findings and conclusions supported by 
proper evidence. After the Court has entered a judg-
ment which has become final and res adjudirata, the 
Court has no power to enter a different judgment, par-
ticularly without a motion to amend the judgment and 
without any new evidence, findings or conclusion:::. 
The Court at no time indicated to counsel for the 
Appellant that he intended to award some cornpt·nsalioii 
to Respondent for his having "preserved the mortgagi' 
loan asset." At thP beginning of the }waring· lwld uu 
F'ehrnary 13, 19G4, Respond1:•nt stated: 
"VV e further intend to sho\\· * * ;:- "·hile lti' 
9 
(Respondent) has been devoting his time for the 
pres;rv~ti?n of the asset _(mor~gage lo~n asset), 
the I lamtiff has been domg his appraisal busi-
ness (R. 1954)." 
From R. 154 to R. 245, the Court took evidence on 
i!F' wa1 ter and ruled against the Respondent. (R 245) 
1 H. liO-G-1-). Counsel for Appellant never requested the 
(onrt to retain jurisdiction of the case. 
Certainly the Appellant never agreed to submit the 
J11atter of compensation for the Respondent for "pre-
~erving the mortgage loan asset." There would be no 
reason to do so after the Court had ruled that "Neither 
party will receive any special compensation for services 
during· this interim period." (R 245). 
POINT VI 
THE RULING WHICH THE COURT MADE IN ITS 
ORDER FOR JUDGMENT (Page 245) DID NOT REQUIRE 
RESPONDENT'S CONSENT TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF 
~IRS. BARLOW AND MR. CHRISTENSEN. 
At Page 6 of his brief, Respondent states: 
"Appellant points out the fact that the Court 
adopted the recommendation of Respondent in 
ordering that all income received by either party 
from January 1, 1963, to February 1, 1964, should 
be distributed in the same manner and as is pro-
vided by the partnership agreement and has here-
tofore been received and distributed, and that 
neither partner will receive any compensation for 
sPrvices during this interim period. It is evident, 
howPver, that when such recommendation was 
mad(• hy Respondent's counsel, it was assumed 
that the partnership agrePrnent, if invoked, be 
10 
invoked in all aspects. This \rnuld n·qi:ini thi· 
consent of Respondent to the t•~nploy1tH'1it of tho~i· 
not employed by the partnerslnp. Thns, Responrl 
ent would be protected and would not tw r·oni-
pelled to pay one-half of the salariPs of such 
employees. See R. 83." 
Respondent cites R. 83 when he no doubt intended 
to cite R. 233. 
A reading of the discussion which took place he-
tween the Court and both counsel ( R. 222-24:5) and par 
ticularly the comment of Mr. Backman at R. 24-t, will 
answer this statement of Respondent. It is apparent 
that the last eight lines of the statement are not true. 
The matters which the Court and counsel were con-
sidering were solely whether the eamings allowed to 
each party should be allowed in accordance with the 
partnership agreement and the prior practice of the 
partnership, and particularly whether Respondent should 
be given fifty per cent of the premiums received on in-
surance policies which had been written with the mort-
gage loans, and the balance placed in the profit and lo~~ 
account from which he would receive fifty per cent there-
of, or whether the income from the insurance policies 
should be divided equally between the partners. In this 
matter the Court ruled in favor of the Respondent. 
There was no discussion as to whether the consent of the 
Respondent to the employment of Mrs. Barlow and Mr. 
Christensen need be obtained. 
4 
\ 
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POINT VII 
THE STATEMENT OF APPELLANT WHICH RESPOND-
ENT CONTENDS MISLED RESPONDENT COULD NOT 
HAVE SO MISLED RESPONDENT. 
At the bottom of Page 6 and at Page 7 of his brief, 
Ri::;pondent states: 
''Appellant bases his argument on the ground 
tlwt the award made by the Court to Respondent 
was at iss1w. It was not made an issue hy any 
pleadings bnt was simply an anno1mcement by a 
court of equity in its arriving at a settlement of 
tlw dispute arising after the Court had rendered 
judgnwnt and after counsel for the parties had 
requested that the Court retain jurisdiction of 
the case to settle the dispute. It is evident that 
Appellant ~would take advantage of his having led 
Respondent into believing that Appellant's net 
income wa8 considerably more than Appellant 
later showed his net income to be, and in counsel's 
in reliance of such representation and recom-
mending to the Court that which he considered a 
fair division of income and expenses, which rec-
onnnendation the Court adopted. Respondent 
later found when the true facts were made known, 
which facts were much different from those rep-
rPsented by Appellant, that not only would Re-
spondent sustain a substantial loss from partici-
pating in any income of Appellant, but Respond-
ent would expose his income to ridiculously high 
operating costs resulting in a much different 
award than had been anticipated." 
It will be noted that the Respondent cites no page 
111 pagl·s of the record in support of the misstatements 
'\'\ forth above. 
(;oing on, at Page S the Respondent quotes the prior 
testimony of Appellant that his income for 1963 and 
.January, 1964, would be approximately $28,000.00, with 
expenditures of about $10,000.00 against that, and he 
goes on to state : 
."In reliance on this rPpresentation and as-
su~mg there would be approximately $20,000.0ll 
go ~to th~ partnership account through Appr,] 
lant s earnmgs, the above referred to recmnmrn-
dation was made by Respondent's counsel. It is 
evident that the Court considered there would bt' 
sufficient income realized by Respondent from 
Appellant's earnings to offset any additional 
award which the Court had theretofore indicated 
it would make to Respondent for his services in 
preserving the assets of the partnershilJ repn!-
sented by the mortgage loan business. The Court, 
realizing the inequity resulting and to correct 
this inequitable situation, stated that it had rP-
tained jurisdiction of the case and made the 
award of $2500.00. 
Again, there is nothing in the record to support the 
assumption which Respondent has made without founda-
tion. The Court at no time stated that it had retained 
jurisdiction of the case. 
The Respondent could not rightly a::;surne that there 
would be approximately $20,000.00 go into the partner-
ship account through Appellant's earnings. He quotes 
Mr. Kiepe as stating that his income for 1963 would be 
approximately $28,000.00, with expenditures of about 
$10,000.00. Under the partnership agreement and the 
practice of the partnership (which the Court ruled woul~ 
be the basis of any award made for the business of 1963 
13 
nnu January, 1964), Appellant was entitled to the first 
fifty per cent of the income for himself, with a graduated 
honns thereon which amounted to $2,365.00 (R. 120). 
Thus, without any expenses of operation, the most that 
RPspondent could expect would go into the partnership 
account through Appellant's earnings of $28,000.00 would 
he $H,000.00, less bonus of $2,365.96, or $11,634.04. There 
conld b0 no possible basis for expecting $20,000.00 to go 
into the partnership account through Appellant's earn-
ings of $28,000.00. Actually, Appellant's earnings were 
$32,120.00 (R. 242) instead of $28,000.00, and the amount 
going into the partnership account through his earnings 
would be $13,695.00 instead of $11,634.00. The amount 
which would go into the partnership account for the 
same period from Respondent's earnings would be 
$8,091.81. 
The Court did not state "that he had retained juris-
diction of the case and made the award of $2500.00." The 
Re::>pondent cites no reference to the record and there 
i~ nothing in the record to support this statement. 
At the bottom of Page 8, the Respondent states: 
"The evidence shows the difficulty Respond-
ent faced in compelling Appellant to render an 
accounting of his earnings as ordered by the Court 
and in having the Appellant each time the matter 
was brought before the Court furnish a different 
aecount, finally forcing the Respondent to obtain 
an order to show cause." 
Again, Respondent fails to cite any page of the 
:PeoHi in support of this misstatement. The matter was 
14 
only brought before the Court once. The Appellant ev. 
plained that some of the accounting rendered by hi~ 
varied because collections had been made in the 1·nt · · erun 
between statements, which necessitated a revision of the 
figures in the accounting (R. 248). Respondent was not 
forced to obtain an order to show cause any more than 
the Appellant was forced to obtain an order to shO\r 
cause against the Respondent. 
POINT VIII 
RESPONDENT PARTICIPATED IN APPELLANT'S AP 
PRAISAL INCOME DURING 1963 THE SAME AS HE DID 
PRIOR THERETO. 
Respondent at Page 9 of his brief states: 
"Appellant argues at Page 20 of his brief 
that Respondent took care of the mortgage loan 
asset for many years before 1963 but received no 
special compensation therdor in addition to hi~ 
fees for making loans and commissions on insur-
ance written with the loans. We point out, how-
(~ver, that Respondent was, during that period of 
time, participating in income from the appraisal 
business of Appellant of which approximately 50 
per cent went into the partnership income which 
was divided equally between the parties after the 
proportionate share of expenses has been charged 
against this income." 
It now appears that Respondent admits that no 
special compensation was ever given to the Respondent 
for "taking care of the mortgage loan asset for many 
years before 1963" but states that the Respondent dur-
ing that period of time "participated in income from the 
appraisal business of Appellant of which approximately 
15 
fifty per eent went into partnership income, which was 
chi<leu equally between the parties after the proportion-
atr share of expenses had been charged against this 
income." During 1963 the same was true. Fifty per 
cent of Appellant's income from the appraisal business 
,1ent into partnership income, except for the bonus paid 
to him. The same was true of the Respondent's income. 
ffowe>vPr, instead of earning a bonus of only $908.19 as 
in 1963, Mr. LeCheminant in prior years earned suffi-
r:ient income that there was paid to him bonuses thereon 
as follows: 
1959 
1960 
1961 ······························ 
1962 ································ 
POINT IX 
$4,046.34 
1,676.39 
1,862.62 
1,848'.58 ( R. 294:) 
THE PARTIES DID NOT SEEK THE AID OF THE 
COURT TO MAKE A DIVISION OF INCOME AND EX-
PENSES DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1963 to FEBRU-
ARY 1, 1964 AFTER THE COURT'S JUDGMENT OF MARCH 
12 WAS ENTERED. 
At page 16 Respondent states: 
"Neither party to the action had by any 
pleadings asked for a determination of the rights 
of the parties during the thirteen-month period 
subsequent to the cutting off date of the partner-
ship as of February 1, 1963. When the parties 
were unable to agree on an equitable division of 
income and expenses during this thirteen-month 
peL'ioJ, the parties sought the aid of the Court 
to settle this controversv which the Court did and 
it resulted in the order .herein appealed from." 
16 
Again, Appellant states this statement is wholh· 
false. As stated at R. 154, before any evidence was intr;. 
duced into the hearing of February 13, 196.t, counsel for 
Respondent stated: 
"We furt~er intend to show that during thP 
past years pnor to the date of the dissolution of 
the partr.iership, February 1, 1963, the Defendant 
has earned on the mortgage loan and insuranrP 
business which Plaintiff is now receiving, and Jw 
has preserved that asset for the partners ~ " • 
and I can appreciate that it may develop into a 
most difficult situation for the Court to have to 
determine what would be fair and just in this 
matter." 
As before stated, the Court then proceeded to hear 
91 pages of evidence and argument on this matter (R. 
152-245) and rendered its decision against the Rm;pond-
ent, and never thereafter heard one word of evidence 
nor one word of argument on the matter of considera-
tion for "preserving the mortgage loan asset." Again, 
Respondent fails to cite a page of the record in support 
of his statement. 
POINT X 
THE AMOUNT THAT BOTH PARTIES WILL BE EN-
TITLED TO CANNOT BE DETERMINED UNTIL THE 
COURT HAS PASSED UPON THE ITEMS OF THIS APPEAL. 
At Page 22 of his brief, Respondent states: 
"The Court erred in its finding that Cross-
A ppellant is entitled to receive the sum of $1~,-
433.22 out of the cash on hand of $28,723.98. Thii 
item results in the assumption that the cro:o;s ~l;j 
peal will be favorable to Cross-Appellant on a 
17 
poinh; relied upon, in which case the award to 
Cross-Appellant should be $20,093.22 and not the 
sum of $16,433.22 awarded to Cross-Appellant by 
the order appealed from." 
lt is true that the calculations of the final amounts 
to be awarded to the parties must await the decision of 
the Court on the other matters argued in Appellant's 
brief and Respondent's brief. 
POINT XI 
AN AW ARD OF A BONUS OF $535.00 TO EACH OF 
THE PARTIES WILL BE OF NO VALUE TO EITHER PARTY. 
At Page 10 of Respondent's brief, referring to the 
award of a bonus of $535.00 to each of the parties in 
the judgment of November 9, 1964, Respondent states: 
"This point is predicated entirely upon an 
accounting principal which the Court considered. 
Appellant had, according to the accounting sub-
mitted, received his revised bonus over and above 
the fifty per cent awarded in the original judg-
ment and the Court, in order to place both parties 
on the same bonus basis, awarded this item to 
Respondent." 
Appellant asks what accounting principle is Re-
spondent talking about 1 
The bonus for the Appellant and the Respondent 
\\'as calculated by the certified public accountant iN ac-
1'ordanee with the judgment of the Court and resulted 
1n the following bonuses: To Appellant, $2,365.96; to 
H~spondent, $908.19. (R. 120). Neither party will bene-
fit a dollar by awarding each a bonus of $535.00 as pro-
18 
vided in the judgment (R. 110). The Court did not 
order a bonus of $535.00, or any other amount, paid to 
the partners (R. 107-R. 108). 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant again submits that the law and evi-
dence require that : 
1. The award of $2500.00 to Respondent for "pre-
serving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership" be 
set aside. 
2. That the bonus of $535.00 to each partner f: set 
aside. 
3. That the portion of the judgment which fixes 
the amount of credits to which Respondent is entitled 
and which fixes the amount of refunds due Appellant 
and the balance credit due Respondent be set aside, and 
that this matter be returned to the trial court for further 
consideration. 
4. Appellant's motion to amend the judgment of 
March 12, 1964, nunc pro tune be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOFFAT, IVERSON AND 
ELG9'REN , .· 
/. ,/7 "---'Z, ~ {' 
/''  
By.. --~~k .... .-.-: .................. -!I 
,/ J. Grant Iverson 
I 
/Attorneys for Appellant 
